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(Faculty Seminar)
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‚̂Ԃ䂫j
[Université
de la Méditeranée and GREQAM]
Ži‰ïŽÒ@F@Îì@—³ˆê˜Y
‰‰@‘è@F@Aggregate
consequences of interactions among boundedly rational@@
heterogeneous agents
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ŠT—v
„
In this
lecture, we consider models and experimental results of interactions among
boundedly rational heterogeneous agents. A particular emphasis will be placed on
understanding the kind of strategic environments that result in such interaction
to generate outcomes that deviate quite largely from the equilibrium prediction
under homogeneous rational agents.